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One of the most significant changes in monetary economics in recent years has been the
virtual disappearance of what was once a dominant focus on money, and in parallel the
disappearance of the LM curve as part of the analytical framework that economists use to think
about issues of monetary policy.  Today’s standard workhorse model consists of an aggregate
demand (or IS) curve and an aggregate supply (or price setting) curve, with the system closed when
appropriate by an equation that represents monetary policy by relating the nominal interest rate to
variables like output and inflation, but typically not either the quantity or the growth rate of money.
This change in the standard analytics is an understandable reflection of how most central
banks now make monetary policy:  by setting a short-term nominal interest rate, with little if any
explicit role for “money.”  But the disappearance of the LM curve has also left two lacunae in how
economists think about monetary policy.  Without the LM curve it is more difficult to take into
account how the functioning of the banking system, and with it the credit markets more generally,
matter for monetary policy.  Abandoning the role of money and the analytics of the LM curve also
leaves open the underlying question of how the central bank manages to fix the chosen interest rate
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Celebrating the distinguished career and prolific contributions of a researcher and
policymaker like Chuck Freedman gives us occasion to take stock.  Chuck’s experience at the
center of Canadian monetary policy has spanned more than three decades.  His professional
interest in the field, dating to the beginning of his post-graduate studies at Oxford, spans four. 
Along the way, he has participated in just about every aspect of the evolution that has taken
place in monetary economics and monetary policymaking.  He has more than earned his place in
the front rank of those whose views one would want to seek out on any issue in the field.  And
both his own country’s government and the economics profession at large have made a habit of
doing just that.
Monetary policymaking is different today than it was four or even three decades ago, and
so is monetary economics.   More specifically, the focus of attention has shifted in important
ways.  During the five years that Chuck Freedman attended MIT, the Journal of Political
Economy published 29 articles on the demand for money: not quite one per issue.  During the-2-
most recent five years, the total number of articles on money demand in the JPE has been three. 
The leading graduate textbook in the field when Chuck was in graduate school was Money,
Interest and Prices, by Don Patinkin.  The book’s title immediately suggested what was to come. 
Patinkin introduced the concept of money demand in the book’s second chapter (it didn’t fit in
Chapter I, “The Theory of a Barter Economy”), and the word “money” appeared in the title of
each of the next six chapters.  The construction and manipulation of what Patinkin called the LL
curve -- his analog to the Hicksian LM curve in his neoclassical setting in which what varied was
not output but prices -- was a central focus of the entire second half of the book, designated
“Macroeconomics.”  By contrast, the text in use in many graduate courses today is David
Romer’s Macroeconomic Theory.  Not only does the book’s title contain no mention of either
“money” or “monetary,” the Romer text has no chapter title with those words either.  The
demand for money makes only two substantive appearances, both fleeting.  The LM curve
occupies less than a page.
More importantly, in parallel to what the allocation of journal and textbook pages
suggests, a shift has visibly taken place in the analytical framework that economists concerned
with monetary policy (to continue to call it that) use to address fundamental research questions
as well as everyday issues of practical policymaking.  A widely read and widely assigned article
in the Journal of Economic Literature several years ago — “The Science of Monetary Policy” by
Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler — presented in canonical form what has become
the standard workhorse of the field: a two-equation model consisting of an aggregate demand (or
IS) curve, relating today’s output level to expected future output and the expected real interest2Clarida, Gali and Gertler were careful to note that the form of the aggregate demand




2 and an aggregate supply (or short-run Phillips) curve relating today’s inflation rate both to
today’s level of output, relative to some capacity benchmark, and to expected future inflation.
What is striking about this two-equation workhorse model is not so much what’s in it —
forward-looking behavior by both price setters and demanders of goods and services, rational
expectations, and so on — but what’s missing.  There is no LM curve.  And there is no variable
labeled “money” either.  To close the model with an equation representing the behavior of
monetary policy, Clarida, Gali and Gertler added a “Taylor rule” relating the nominal interest
rate to output and inflation (but, again, neither the quantity nor the growth rate of money).
A traditional question about any scientific discipline is the balance of influence, between
internal intellectual dynamics and the external environment, in shaping the evolution of ideas in
the field:  Does creative thinking evolve primarily in an axiomatic way -- that is, because so-and-
so’s hypothesis opened the path for somebody else to think such-and-such?  Or does new
thinking arise mostly in response to tension between the implications of existing thinking and
what everyone can readily observe in the world around them?  
Monetary economics, or macroeconomics, has always displayed a large element of
influence due to the external environment.  The subject emerged as a recognizable field within
economics in response to the upheavals caused by the depression of the 1930s.  The concepts of
aggregate demand, unused resources, price stickiness and market disequilibrium that grew out of
that experience -- all with a focus on a short-term horizon in which familiar dynamics did not
fully play themselves out -- became the central supports of the discipline for the next four-4-
decades.  Then the inflation of the 1970s, importantly including the disinflation of the 1980s,
reshaped the field in yet new ways.  Aggregate supply, inflation expectations and money growth
became (or, in some cases, became again) essential concepts, and the time horizon within which
various dynamics did work themselves through returned into view.  And, of course, the force of
ongoing economic events affected not just what conceptual constructs were central to the field
but what people thought about the key substantive questions in it: Does monetary policy affect
output and other aspects of real economic activity?  How costly is disinflation?  Can monetary
and fiscal policies operate fully independently?
The LM curve, representing the equilibrium of money demand and money supply — or
equivalently, for many purposes, the solved-out money market-goods market system expressed
in the form of a relation between aggregate demand and the money stock — was a staple of
macroeconomic analysis of both the 1930s vintage and the 1970s vintage.  It was the starting
point for thinking about how a central bank, by changing the supply of (outside) money, could
influence prices or output or both.  In the case in which the central bank instead fixed an interest
rate, by supplying money perfectly elastically, the LM curve per se became trivially horizontal,
but the underlying supply-demand apparatus still importantly indicated how much money
households and firms in the economy would choose to hold at the designated interest rate.
This remains the way much of macroeconomics is taught to undergraduates.  The latest
(2003) edition of Greg Mankiw’s Macroeconomics includes a full presentation of the LM curve
as one of the two building blocks of the determination of aggregate demand, and in particular the
point of entry for thinking about monetary policy.  But the model laid out by Clarida, Gali and
Gertler, with only the aggregate demand/IS curve to go along with the aggregate supply/price-5-
setting curve, has now become the starting point for much of the familiar research in the field. 
Moreover, it is, in summary form, increasingly what policy-oriented discussions within central
banks look like.  A generation ago, even as the rational expectations revolution spawned a
burgeoning line of academic research based on intertemporal optimizing models with explicit
microfoundations, the everyday conversation within central banks continued to be based,
sometimes explicitly but much more often in substance, on the logic of an IS curve intersecting
an LM curve.  Today the IS curve has survived, but the LM is gone.
What makes the disappearance of the LM curve (and, in parallel, the disappearance of
interest in the demand for money) so unusual in the evolution of macroeconomic thinking is that,
unlike the sea changes that occurred after the 1930s and the 1970s, this intellectual shift has been
a product not of events in the economy but of changes in policymaking practice.  If central banks
still made monetary policy by fixing the level or growth rate of some measure of outside money
— bank reserves, the monetary base, or some equivalent — it is hard to imagine that researchers
and students in the field would have dropped the LM curve from their analysis.  But in recent
years few if any central banks have either formulated or implemented their policy in that way. 
Even now that central banks make policy by fixing an interest rate, if they did so with the
near-term objective of steering some measure of (inside) money growth along a designated target
path — as many used to do a couple of decades ago — the LM curve and the representation of
money demand standing behind it would still be central to policy analysis.  But nowadays most
central banks don’t do that either.  As a result, neither the LM curve nor even the concept of
money demand any longer has much bearing on what we continue to call monetary policy. 
Perhaps in time the generic name for this form of economic policy will change as well.  (In the-6-
vocabulary used within the Federal Reserve Bank of New York when I worked there as a student
intern, at the same time Chuck Freedman was studying at MIT, the purpose of the Federal Open
Market Committee was to take decisions on “credit policy.”)  
It is difficult today to see how the LM curve will re-establish itself in the economics of
monetary policymaking — unless, of course, central banks go back to making policy in terms of
target rates for money growth.  This is not a loss to be lamented.  Even so, the disappearance of
the LM curve leaves two other lacunae that in time may prove more a matter of concern.  First,
the disappearance of the LM curve has made it more difficult to take into account the functioning
of the banking system within standard macroeconomic analysis of monetary policy.  The LM
curve immediately brought one side of the banks’ balance sheet into the picture: their liabilities. 
From there, it was straight forward that (except for changes in bank capital, which are usually
small in the short run) whatever happened to total liabilities also had to track the fluctuation in
total assets.  And this link opened the way to bring into the analysis the full range of theoretical
work on the supply and demand for credit, as well as the flow of information from lending
institutions that most central banks normally monitor.  With no LM curve, and no explicit role
for the demand for money, integrating the credit markets into both the theoretical and the
practical analysis of monetary policy is going to be harder.  In short, no deposits, no credit.
Second, dropping the LM curve, in recognition that most central banks make monetary
policy not by fixing outside money or targeting inside money but instead by fixing some interest
rate, leaves open the underlying question of how the central bank manages to fix the chosen
interest rate in the first place.  This is a subject that Chuck and I, along with Charles Goodhart
and Mike Woodford, have debated before, and this occasion is not the right time to revisit that3The exception that proves the rule is Japan.  The Japanese case serves as a reminder that
wrong-headed monetary policy can also influence real economic outcomes, and seriously so.
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argument.  For present purposes, what is interesting is that one of the key phenomena under
discussion in that debate is the fact that in recent years central banks — including those that fix
the relevant short-term interest rate by some kind of “channel” system, as well as others, like the
Federal Reserve, that do not — are able to move market interest rates by means of transactions
that are negligibly small in magnitude, and often without engaging in any transactions at all. 
Whatever the explanation may be, it seems very far away from the traditional story in which an
open market operation either increases or decreases the quantity of outside money, thereby
shifting the LM curve while the demand for money remains functionally stable.
What should we think, with the benefit of hindsight, about the role that the LM curve
played in thinking about monetary policy over so many decades?  Was it just a distraction?   Or a
valuable construct whose usefulness was overtaken by changes in how policymakers go about
their business?  And does anyone now regret those changes in policymaking?  Or seek to reverse
them?
With or without the LM curve, confidence in the efficacy of monetary policy has rarely
been higher.
3  The chronic inflation of three decades ago now seems a distant memory.  The
power of that historical episode to motivate useful new research in the field is dissipating, just as
the hold exerted by the depression gradually waned in the face of the mostly full-employment
post-war economy.  Some countries conquered their inflation in part by changing their monetary
policymaking institutions. Importantly, however, others succeeded against inflation with no
institutional change, or changed their mode of policymaking only after inflation had already4BPEA, No. 2, 2002, p. 33.
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abated.  It is no longer a commonplace to think that monetary policy, when made by central
banks not subject to some kind of external straightjacket, is subject to unavoidable inflationary
biases.
Just as important, no central banker makes policy today as if his or her actions had no
effect on real economic outcomes.  Moreover, today no central banker feels the need to be
apologetic about believing that monetary policy does affect real outcomes.  Bob Lucas’ famous
“critique” of macroeconomic policymaking appeared shortly after Chuck first joined the Bank of
Canada, and the playing out of that line of thought has been a major part of the evolution within
the field ever since.  More than a quarter-century later, there is active research questioning all
three of the basic underpinnings of the “new classical” demonstration of the neutrality of
systematic monetary policy: flexible wages and prices (the assumption on which economists who
rejected monetary neutrality focused attention almost immediately), the “natural rate” model of
aggregate supply, and, most recently, even the rationality of expectations.  As Chris Sims
tellingly wrote in the latest issue of the Brookings Papers, in a study of the use of traditional
macroeconometric models within central banks, “The FRBUS model is seldom used in its
‘model-consistent expectations’ mode.  Most uses of the model are for monetary policy, and with
a horizon of up to two years or so.  In this time frame it is not reasonable to suppose that the
public would quickly perceive and act on a shift in policy behavior.”
4  Today, most economists
would probably agree with Chris’ statement.  But this is exactly what was at issue in the original
claim that monetary policy could not affect real outcomes because changes in expectations
would undo the behavior that such models implied.-9-
The difficult challenge, in the new world of monetary policy with no LM curve and no
substantial role for money demand, will be to understand the relationships between what
individual households and firms and banks and asset management firms do — rearranging their
portfolios, making and taking loans, buying and selling equities and perhaps foreign currencies,
investing in physical assets, buying and selling real goods and services, hiring and selling labor,
and setting prices and wages, all in ways that somehow depend in part on the interest rates that
central banks set — and the observable influence of monetary policy on such features of the
aggregate economy as output and employment and inflation.  In many respects, this task is
simply a part of the broader integration of microeconomics and macroeconomics that has been
on the profession’s agenda for decades.
Economists often aspire to make our discipline more like physics.  (Joel Cohen once
accused social scientists more generally of “physics-envy.”) Just as there are today two
“economicses” — micro and macro, referring to the behavior of individual agents and aggregate
economies, respectively — there are also two “physicses”: quantum theory, which describes the
behavior of the tiniest particles of matter, and Newtonian mechanics (as amended by the theory
of relativity), which applies to far larger bodies.  One of the challenges that physicists face is to
integrate the two.  As the distinguished mathematician Roger Penrose has pointed out, however,
the way to do so is clearly not simply to take the principles of quantum theory and apply them
wholesale to larger bodies.  Doing so leads, in Penrose’s classic example, to concluding that a
basketball can be in two places at once.  An important part of what we have learned about
monetary policy during the years spanned by Chuck Freedman’s professional career is that
simply applying to aggregate economies what we know about the behavior of rational, profit- or5Avot 2:16.
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utility-maximizing individual agents similarly leads to patent contradictions of the behavior of
the economic world in which we live.
The field of monetary economics has made impressive progress over the years that Chuck
Freedman has been a part of it, and the fact that we have not yet fully met this daunting
challenge in no way diminishes the progress we have made.  One of history’s great moralists
(Chuck will immediately recognize the words of the second-century sage R. Tarphon) explained,
“You are not required to finish the task; but neither are you free to neglect it altogether.”
5  None
of us has finished the task taken up by monetary economics.  Chuck Freedman has certainly
never neglected it.